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Abstract—The Domain Name System (DNS) is one of the most
fundamental components of the Internet. While glue is widely
used and heavily relied on in DNS operations, there is little
thinking about the necessity, complexity, and venerability of such
prevalent configuration. This work is the first to provide
extensive and systematic analysis of DNS glue. It discusses the
availability implications of glue and proposes the minimum glue
records in terms of availability. It also identifies the security
vulnerabilities of glue as well as the limitations of current
countermeasures. Measurements show the wide occurrences of
glue redundancies and glue vulnerabilities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Domain Name System (DNS) is one of the most
fundamental components of the Internet, providing a critical
link between human users and Internet locations by mapping
host names to IP addresses. Besides translating human-friendly
names into IP address, DNS is also used for looking up mail
servers associated with a domain, discovering the server(s)
providing for a particular service on the network, reversely
mapping IP addresses to domain names, etc. Nearly all today's
Internet applications rely on the DNS for proper function.
The ubiquity and criticality of the DNS necessitates both
the availability and authenticity of responses. Name resolution
malfunction or failure may impact the Internet services and
applications as well as user experience. e.g., during January
2001 users found Microsoft website in outages because all the
authoritative servers for the Microsoft DNS domain became
inaccessible due to a simple configuration mistake [1]. The
DNS root servers also have witness massive DDoS attacks in
2002 and 2007 [2] [3] when the global Internet service was
more or less disrupted. Bogus DNS response may direct users
to dead or unresponsive servers to find the unavailability of
service, or even to malicious servers with the risk of privacy
violation or sensitive information leakage. e.g., some DNS
implementation vulnerabilities were exploited to inject
malicious data into the cache of DNS resolvers [4] [5]. So The
importance of correct and continuous functionality of DNS
worths significant efforts to improve DNS resilience and
security to both scenarios.
"DNS is a very complex system, even though its rules are
simple and few, and even though a new DNS protocol agent
can be constructed using only a few thousand lines of software
code."[6] In essence, DNS is a distributed, coherent, reliable,
autonomous, hierarchical database. It consists of a fast-growing
name space, which is divided into a large number of zones. The
administer or owner of a domain may delegate part of its name
space to another domain known as a subdomain.The root zone
resides at the top of the DNS hierarchy. Starting from the root
zone, delegation may take place recursively at each domain,
thereby an inverted DNS tree is constructed from the top
down.e.g., Top Level Domains (TLDs) such as "com"and
"org" are delegated at the root zone,and Second Level Domains
(SLDs) such as "foo.com" and "foo.org" are delegated at its
parent zone "com" and "org" respectively. Roughly speaking,
name resolution also follows the DNS tree from the top down.
However, DNS complexity has its effects more far-reaching
than the simple tree.
Besides the parent-child relationship between any adjacent
zones in the DNS tree, there are still other administrative
dependencies among some seemingly irrelative domains.Such
dependencies are created by locators of the sub-name space at
each delegation. The delegation locator is represented as NS
resource records where the subdomain and its nameservers are
provided. To facilitate the locating of the delegated
subdomain's nameservers, the IP addresses of such
nameservers may be also presented at the delegation point.
Besides the parent-child relationship between any adjacent
zones in the DNS tree, there are still other administrative
dependencies among some seemingly irrelative domains.Such
dependencies are created by locators of the sub-name space at
each delegation. The delegation locator is represented as NS
resource records where the subdomain and its nameservers are
provided. To facilitate the locating of the delegated
subdomain's nameservers, the IP addresses of such
nameservers may be also presented at the delegation point and
included in the DNS response as part of referrals to the queries.
These IP addresses records (in the form of A type for IPv4 or
AAAA type for IPv6) are called "glue" records. The absence of
such glue records either at the pertinent zone or in the pertinent
response may make resolvers initiate a name resolution for the
subdomain's nameservers to get their IP addresses. In the worst
case, missing glue records can even cause name resolution
failure due to cyclic dependency between a zone and its
descendants. If the delegated nameservers fall into domains out
of bailiwick of their authoritatively served domains, the
nameserver resolution may involve inter-organizational
dependencies. Such delegation locator resolution adds to the
DNS complexity as well as raises availability and security
concerns. On one hand, missing or misconfiguration of
resource records which delegation locator depends on may
disrupt the availability of name resolution. On the other hand,
delegation locator may be targeted or exploited by attackers to
mislead name resolution towards malicious nameservers.
Consistent with the principle of "descriptive rather than
prescriptive" [7], DNS was specified loosely, meaning that
each implementor may differently understand, interpret, thus
implement DNS protocols. Provided that the looseness of the
DNS specification should be seen as a strength rather than a
weakness, it should still be necessary to rule about any points
that are operationally believed to avoid vulnerabilities and
secure availability.
Security is not among the basic design considerations of the
original DNS. In the past two decades, attacks against DNS
have been identified to be increasingly extensive and
destructive. As the efforts to improve the security of DNS,
DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [8], [9] is introduced by
IETF as a set of extensions to DNS which provide data origin
authentication, data integrity, and authenticated denial of
existence.
As a large scale infrastructure upgrade, DNSSEC is being
gradually rolled out in the last few years. In June 2009, .org
became the first Top-Level Domain (TLD) to sign its zone
with DNSSEC. In July 2010, the signed root zone was
available. There are 1298 TLDs in the root zone in total,
among which 1129 TLDs are signed and publish their DS
records in the root zone by May 4th, 2016. Compared with
TLDs, the adoption rate of DNSSEC is extremely low at lower
DNS levels. Kalafut et al. found that of the 4,947,993 SLD
DNS zone data gathered, 161 zones, which is a mere 0.003%
of the total, have the DNSKEY records [10]. As the protocol
and administrative complexity added by DNSSEC is non-
trivial, the incremental global DNSSEC deployment is
expected to be a long transition. At least in part due to the
limited DNSSEC deployment so far, some seemingly natural
and popular practices potentially create security vulnerabilities.
Moreover, if operated obliviously, the aforementioned DNS
dependency complexity may even increase such vulnerabilities.
On the other hand, as a cryptographic defense, DNSSEC is far
from all omnipotent, and some weakness may still be exploited
by a certain type of attack such as Man-in-the-Middle (MitM)
attacks.
While glue records are widely used and heavily relied on in
DNS operations, there is little thinking about the necessity,
complexity, and venerability of such popular practice. This
work is the first to provide extensive and systematic analysis of
glue records.
The paper is organized as follows. The availability
implications of glue are discussed in Section II. Section III
presents the security implications of glue. The measurement
study is illustrated in Section IV. Some related work are
presented in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. THE AVAILABILITY IMPLICATIONS OF GLUE
A. The diverse definitions of glue
If a zone delegates part of its name space to other
administrators, such delegation (or often referred to as "zone
cut") is represented as "glue" in the zone. "Glue" includes any
record in a zone file that is not properly part of that zone,
including nameserver records of delegated subzones (NS
records), address records that accompany those NS records (A,
AAAA, etc), and any other stray data that might appear. Here
NS records are indispensable for a zone cut while
accompanying address records and other stray data do not
necessarily appear in glue. So we refer to accompanying
address records and other stray data as "glue RRs" hereafter.
Basically, the NS RR (Resource Record) set indicates the
nameserver(s) that be authoritative for a delegated child zone,
and the glue records indicate the IP addresse(s) for such name
server(s).
The most notable ambiguity arises about glue may be
presence of glue RRs in the zone because DNS specifications
are vague in this point. In practice, different policies are
applied with respect to provisioning glue RRs with the
delegating zone [11].
A narrowly defined glue policy can be found in RFC 1034
[12], where glue RRs are provisioned if and only if the name
server resides within or below the delegated (child) zone (that
is, within the delegated domain). We call this kind of glue RRs
"bailiwick". Fig.1 illustrates an example of delegations of a
child zone "foo.com" in its parent zone ("com") file. In Fig. 1,
line 1 shows a name server "ns.foo.com" residing within the
delegated (child) zone "foo.com". Fig. 2 illustrates the zone
file of "foo.com", where a child zone "foo.foo.com" is
delegated. So line 2 in Fig. 1 shows a name server
"ns.foo.foo.com" residing below the delegated (child) zone
"foo.com" (that is, within the grandchild zone "foo.foo.com").
So the narrow policy only allows for line 5 and line 6 as the
glue RRs without offering line 7 and 8.
$ORIGIN com.
Name Type Value
1 foo NS ns.foo
2 foo NS ns.foo.foo
3 foo NS ns.foo.net.
4 foo NS ns.bar
5 ns.foo A 192.0.1.1
6 ns.foo.foo A 192.0.2.2
7 ns.foo.net. A 192.0.2.2
8 ns.bar A 192.0.3.3
9 bar NS ns.foo.net.
Fig. 1. Example zone data of “com” using RFC 1035 notation [15].
RFC 973 suggests that glue RRs are always provisioned for
all name servers [13]. In Fig. 1, this mandatory policy is
equivalent to present line 5-8 simultaneously.
A moderate policy is suggested in RFC 1033 and used for
the root zone [14]. It suggests that glue RRs are provisioned if
and only if the name server resides below the delegating
(parent) zone. This policy imposes less constraints on glue RRs
than that defined by RFC 1034, allowing for glue RRs of name
servers below apex of the parent zone but beyond the bailiwick
of the delegated (child) zone. In Fig. 1, the moderate policy
presents line 5, 6 and 8 as the glue RRs.
$ORIGIN foo.com.
Name Type Value
1 @ NS ns
2 @ NS ns.foo
3 @ NS ns.foo.net.
4 @ NS ns.bar.com
5 ns A 192.0.1.1
6 foo NS ns.foo.org
Fig. 2. Example zone data of “foo.com” using RFC 1035 notation [15].
B. The Availability Implications of Glue
To clarify the definition of glue, we derive the minimum
glue RRs required for domain name resolution. And we also
discuss the implications and perils of aggressive usage of glue
RRs.
a) The minimum glue RRs required for name resolution
We can see in Fig. 1 that in-bailiwick glue RR should
always be given in the domain. The reason a glue record must
exist for nameservers within the domain can be illustrated by
looking at what would happen if the glue record were not
present. If the query to the "com" nameserver for "foo.com"
returned the name but not the IP address of "ns.foo.com", then
a further query should be required for the A record of
"ns.foo.com"; but since the IP of the "foo.com" nameserver is
not yet known, it must query the "com" nameserver, which
answers again with the name but not the IP... and so on ad
infinitum. So such in-bailiwick glue RRs are among the
minimum glue RRs, therefore should be treated as mandatory.
One may consider any out-of-bailiwick glue RR as non-
mandatory. However, absence of out-of-bailiwick glue RR
may cause resolution unavailability problem because cyclic
dependency can be formed based on domain name
interdependence. Such cyclic dependency emerges when two
or more zones' glue RRs depend on each other in a circular
way: to resolve a name server of a glue RR in zone Z1, one
needs to first resolve it in Z2, and the name server' zone in Z2
is in turn delegated to a name server below Z3, and so on, until
finally the chained delegation interdependency comes back to
Z1.
$ORIGIN com.
Name Type Value
1 foo NS ns.foo.net.
2 ns.foo.net A 192.0.1.1
$ORIGIN net.
Name Type Value
1 foo NS ns.foo.com.
2 ns.foo.com A 192.0.2.2
Fig. 3. Example zone data of two-zone cyclic dependency using RFC 1035
notation [15].
Fig. 3 shows two examples of cyclic zone dependencies.
The first example involves two zone interdependency, where
"foo.com" is delegated to an out-of-bailiwick name server
"ns.foo.net" in its parent zone "com", and likewise, "foo.net" is
in turn delegated to an out-of-bailiwick name server
"ns.foo.com" in its parent zone "net". If non-bailiwick glue RR
are provided in neither zones, resolution of any name below
"foo.com" or "foo.net" will fall into the cyclic zone
dependencies failing to find the final answer. A more
complicated three zone interdependency is illustrated in Fig. 4,
where "com", "net", "org", and "com" are chained in order via
cyclic delegated name servers. We can see that glue RR should
also be mandatory in case of cyclic zone dependencies to
ensure the resolution availability.
$ORIGIN com.
Name Type Value
1 foo NS ns.foo.net.
2 ns.foo.net A 192.0.1.1
$ORIGIN net.
Name Type Value
1 foo NS ns.foo.org.
2 ns.foo.org A 192.0.2.2
$ORIGIN org.
Name Type Value
1 foo NS ns.foo.com.
2 ns.foo.com A 192.0.3.3
Fig. 4. Example zone data of three-zone cyclic dependency using RFC 1035
notation [15].
To break cyclic zone dependencies without changing any
delegation (NS RR), glue RR should be added to at least one
zone involved in one cyclic zone dependencies. The zone
accompanying with glue RR acts as the door to the
authoritative data and may be relied on by any zone involved in
the cyclic zone dependencies following the delegation chain.
To summarize, the minimum glue RRs required for domain
name resolution consists of in-bailiwick glue RRs and glue
RRs in one zone involved in each cyclic zone dependencies.
b) The implications and perils of aggressive usage of
glue RRs
The aggressive use of glue RRs may cause concerns about
the consistency with their authoritative counterparts. For the
sake of resolution correctness, the glue RRs in their apex zone
should be kept as replicas of the IP address RRs pertaining to
the same NS RRs in their authoritative zone. But DNS
specifications neither force a tight coupling between the two
nor provide any mechanism to ensure such coupling. So in
DNS operations, inconsistency problem possibly arises for glue
RRs. e.g., a set of IP address RRs are kept both at the
authoritative zone A and the apex zone B. Each time the
operator of zone A makes changes to its IP address RRs, the
operator of zone B must perceive such changes in time (or the
operator of zone A actively notifies the operator of zone B
about such changes) and update its glue RRs accordingly.
When changes at zone A are not reflected to the glue RRs at
zone B, a lame delegation may occur because an IP address of
a DNS server that is listed as an authoritative server for a
delegated zone cannot provide authoritative answers for names
in that zone. Given the potential risks of glue RR inconsistency,
excessive glue RRs widely used for delegations may increase
the possibility of lame delegations.
III. THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF GLUE
A. Cache Poisoning Attacks
Dan Kaminsky discovered a serious vulnerability in DNS
[16], which allows an attacker to spoof DNS records and
redirect network clients to alternate servers. The Kaminsky
attacks do not require the ability of reading and writing the
incoming and outgoing DNS messages of authoritative servers.
Instead, a Kaminsky attacker issues a flurry of queries, each for
a different random name under the target main domain, aiming
at evading the cache of a victim recursive resolver and
triggering its outstanding outgoing queries. Such flurry of
queries creates many outstanding queries at the victim
recursive resolver in the window of responding delays. The
attacker then generates replies for each random name query
before the real reply arrives from the authoritative server. Each
reply guesses the source port and transaction ID of its query to
achieve a match, and contains spoofed NS RRs and glue RRs
as delegation information. The chance of successful match is
very likely in a short time using automatic tools. The recursive
resolver will then accept the reply and cache the spoofed NS
RRs and glue RRs, which are then utilized as authoritative
servers for the afterwards name resolutions.
Man-in-the-Middle attacks are more powerful than
Kaminsky attacks in that the MitM attackers have read and
write access to network packets belonging to the victim. So the
MitM attackers do not have to guess the source port and
transaction ID of query to get a match to have a spoofed DNS
reply accepted by the recursive resolver. They can simply copy
the correct source port and transaction ID in the spoofed DNS
reply, which will then poison the cache of the recursive
resolver.
Kaminsky and MitM attacks share the ability to inject
spoofed DNS data into cache of recursive resolvers. However,
the seemingly matching response to the outstanding queries
does not necessarily comply with other constrains imposed by
DNS specifications and practices. So it is still possible for
resolvers to detect some (if not all) deliberately and
maliciously formed DNS replies if they are not in compliance
with DNS specifications and practices. Resolvers may perform
additional checking on the received matching response before
those pass the checking are finally accepted.
B. Bailiwick-checking and Its Improvements
The most prevalent practice of thwarting DNS tampering
attacks is to implement bailiwick-checking. Basically, the
purpose of the bailiwick-checking is to prevent malicious
response from providing out-of-bailiwick DNS records as part
of a referral. In history, the bailiwick-checking was motivated
by kashpureff cache poisoning [5]. In 1997, Eugene
Kashpureff of Alternic poisoned multiple DNS caching servers
which later redirected web traffic from internic.net to
alternic.com. The hack showed incorrect NS or A records
provided in glue could be trusted by some DNS
implementations and cached. This vulnerability produces
bailiwick-checking for both NS and glue records to fix it.
While DNS specifications does not define a concrete
bailiwick rule, some implementations, such as BIND [17],
Unbound [18], and MaraDNS [19], adopt their characteristic
bailiwick-checking algorithms. Here we analyze bailiwick-
checking algorithms of the three implementations and explore
what they mean for the MitM attacks.
a) BIND
BIND's bailiwick-checking consists of NS checking and
glue checking.
For the NS records, the resolver checks whether the domain
in question is a subdomain of the NS records in the authority
section of the received response. If it is, the resolver next
checks whether the domain in the authority section is a
subdomain of the current domain where the recursive DNS
resolution resides. Only if both conditions hold, the resolver
caches the NS-type RRset received in the referral. The NS
checking ensures only in-bailiwick NS records in the referral
are accepted and used by resolvers for replying to their clients.
For the glue records, the next step is to determine whether
to cache them in the additional section of the referral. If the
domain of glue record in the additional section is a subdomain
of currently residing domain, the glue record is cached;
otherwise, it is not cached and the resolver will initiate new
queries for the domain of glue record in the additional section.
b) Unbound
Unbound's bailiwick checking is very different from BIND.
All records, that are pertinent to the domains out of the
bailiwick of the current domain where the recursive DNS
resolution resides, are simply removed from the received
responses. The remaining records in the additional and
authority sections, if pass the NS checking and glue checking,
are cached, but, by default, not sent to clients. The most
remarkable difference of the bailiwick checking between
Unbound and BIND is that Unbound simply denies out-of-
bailiwick domains in the authority section as referral while
BIND accepts them by issuing new queries for them. Thus
BIND is more flexible and resilience in that at least one in-
bailiwick referral is a must for Unbound and BIND has no such
constraints.
c) MaraDNS
The bailiwick logic is weakened by MaraDNS. It does not
cache the authority and additional section of responses, and
refrains from performing much of bailiwick-checking.
Furthermore, even for referral responses, MaraDNS caches
neither the NS mapping from the domain name to an
authoritative server name (authority section), nor the A
mapping from the latter name to an IP address (additional
section). Instead, MaraDNS simply stores an authority section
with a mapping from the domain name to the IP address. The
bailiwick-checking here is very loose: no matter whether the
domains in referral is in-bailiwick or out-of-bailiwick, and no
matter where the additional section contains glue records or
authoritative records, just accept all domain-to-IP mappings
that are provided. So such mappings may deviate from the
authoritative and more trustworthy ones.
d) Improvement Proposals
Note that NS checking may add no security profit to
DNSSEC-aware resolvers. Because signature over DS records
itself secure the authentication of the NS records. In other
words, no attacker can forge a NS record in the referral, and
meanwhile, get the forged verified.
There is subtle misconception and misbehavior for BIND's
glue record checking. A subdomain of currently residing
domain by no means guarantees it falls into the bailiwick of the
currently residing domain. Instead, a subdomain of currently
residing domain may be delegated into a new zone, which is
obviously out of the bailiwick of the currently residing domain.
e.g., ns.example.com is a subdomain of com, and also a
subdomain of example.com when example.com is delegated by
com. In that case, the glue records provided from com for
ns.example.com are not authoritative ones, whereas the
authoritative ones are indicated nowhere but in example.com.
So BIND's bailiwick-checking risks taking the glue records as
trustworthy and caching them as well as losing the change to
fetch the authoritative ones. Under BIND's bailiwick-checking
algorithm, the glue records should be carefully configured in
com as a replica of the authoritative ones maintained elsewhere.
Any inconsistency between them may impact domain
availability or cause lame delegation.
To learn from lessons of DNS implementations in use and
clarify the best current practice, we propose that at least two
principles for bailiwick-checking should be adhered:
 An authoritative server name that a domain is
delegated to, either in-bailiwick or out-of-bailiwick, should
always be allowed by bailiwick-checking. This fosters a
diversity of DNS delegations.
 Any glue records pertinent to the authoritative server
name of delegation may be temporarily used to fetch the
authoritative counterparts. Then the authoritative counterparts
replace the corresponding glue records and get cached by
resolvers. This ensures only authoritative mappings are cached.
As we know, glue RRs can never be part of the zone's
authoritative data. They are ranked as the least trustworthiness
in data from all sources [20]. Moreover, they would never be
returned as answers to a received query by a resolver. To
ensure trustworthiness of glue RRs, a trustworthiness
validation using data from glue RRs' real authorities is required
even if glue RRs are temporally used during a resolver's
domain name resolution. e.g., each of the glue RRs in line 5-8
of Fig. 1 should be validated by resolvers when they are
fetched from the parent zone "com" as referrals and then
directly used to reach the child zone "foo.com". The so called
validation means that the resolver should solicit the
authoritative counterparts of the glue RRs from their
authoritative servers, and then check whether the previously
obtained glue RRs are consistent with the later obtained
authoritative counterparts. If inconsistency occurs, the latter
should be regarded as more trustworthy and replace the former.
As examples, the consistency checking of validation takes
place between line 5 in Fig. 1 (glue RR) and line 5 in Fig. 2
(authoritative RR), line 6 in Fig. 1 (glue RR) and the
authoritative RR in the name server "ns.foo.org" (see line 6 in
Fig. 2), line 7 in Fig. 1 (glue RR) and the authoritative RR in
the name server of "ns.foo.net", and so on.
C. Failure of Bailiwick-checking against Cache Poisoning
Bailiwick-checking is not always effective for some
deliberately and meticulously orchestrated attacks especially in
DNSSEC oblivious occasions. In this section, we discuss how
cache poisoning attackers can successfully pass the proposed
version of bailiwick-checking in Section B and redirect
resolvers to a bogus nameserver in their control. Here we
assume that DNSSEC is not deployed to protect DNS data.
Fig. 5. Example name resolution using the improved bailiwick-checking.
An example name resolution using the improved bailiwick-
checking is illustrated in Fig. 5. The detailed process is
elaborated in the following steps:
① The resolver queries the IP address of "www.foo.com"
to the "com" nameservers;
② The "com" nameservers return a referral to resolver. The
referral indicates that "foo.com" is delegate to a nameserver
"ns.foo.com" (in the authority section), and the IP address of
"ns.foo.com" is "192.0.1.1" (as a glue RR in the additional
section);
③ The resolver performs bailiwick-checking for the glue
RR: first it temporarily accepts the glue RR and follows it to
query the authoritative version of the glue RR to "192.0.1.1" ;
④ When the nameserver "192.0.1.1" returns an
authoritative response confirming that the IP address of
"ns.foo.com" is "192.0.1.1", the resolver successfully
completes its bailiwick-checking and trusts the delegation and
its glue RR;
⑤ The resolver queries the IP address of "www.foo.com"
to the "foo.com" nameserver.
The improved bailiwick-checking can only guarantee the
consistency between the glue RR and its claimed authoritative
counterpart. But cache poisoning attacker can maintain the
same authoritative data as the bogus glue RR in its bogus
nameservers, and redirect bailiwick-checking to it by injecting
the bogus glue RR. To compare with the similar scenario in Fig.
5, such attacks are illustrated in Fig. 6. The detailed process is
elaborated in the following steps:
① The resolver queries the IP address of "www.foo.com"
to the "com" nameservers, and the query is either initiated by
Kaminsky attackers or overheard by MitM attackers;
② The cache poisoning attackers manage to inject a
referral to resolver. The referral may keep the nameserver as
"ns.foo.com" (in the authority section), but spoof the IP address
of "ns.foo.com" as "192.0.2.2" (as a glue RR in the additional
section);
③ The resolver performs bailiwick-checking by querying
the IP address of "ns.foo.com" to the bogus nameserver
"192.0.2.2" ;
④ The bogus "foo.com" nameserver configures an A type
RR in its zone indicating that the IP address of "ns.foo.com" is
"192.0.2.2". So it response with the RR to the resolver, so the
resolver successfully completes its bailiwick-checking and
trusts the delegation and its bogus glue RR;
⑤ The resolver queries the IP address of "www.foo.com"
to the bogus "foo.com" nameserver, so the response may be
also bogus at the mercy of the attackers.
Fig. 6. Example cache poisoning against bailiwick-checking.
D. DNSSEC and Its Defending against Cache Poisoning
a) DNSSEC
Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC)
standards [8], [9] was designed to provide data integrity, origin
authenticity, and authenticated denial of existence based on
public key cryptography.
Public/private key pairs are used for the authentication of
each zone. The public keys are stored in DNSKEY RRset, and
all the signatures signed over other records using DNSSKEY
are stored in RRSIG RRset. Both DNSKEY and RRSIG are
included in the zone as part of it. In response to a query
soliciting DNSSEC, an authoritative server returns both the
requested data and its associated RRSIG RRset. A resolver that
has learned the DNSKEY of the requested zone can verify the
origin authenticity and integrity of the reply data using the
DNSKEY. To resist replay attacks, each signature carries a
definitive expiration time.
In order to authenticate the DNSKEY for a given zone, say
"www.foo.com", the resolver needs to construct a chain of trust
that follows the DNS hierarchy from a trusted root zone key
down to the key of the zone in question. In the ideal case, the
public key of the DNS root zone would be obtained offline in a
secure way and stored at the resolver, so that the resolver can
use it to authenticate the public key of TLD "com"; the public
key of "com" would then be used to authenticate the public key
of its child zone "foo.com". A parent zone must encode the
authentication of each of its child zone's public keys in the
DNS. To accomplish this, the parent zone creates and signs a
Delegation Signer (DS) RR that corresponds to a DNSKEY
RR at the child zone, and creates an authentication link from
the parent to child. It is the child zone's responsibility to
request an update to the DS RR every time the child's
DNSKEY changes.
When a DNS request queries a non-existing record, an
authoritative server returns a negative NXDOMAIN or
NODATA response, where NXDOMAIN means the queried
name is non-existent and NODATA means the queried RR
type of an existent name is non-existent. To authenticate such
responses, DNSSEC introduces new types of records, namely
NSEC and NSEC3, to be signed and thus authenticated.
NSEC [8] allows to cryptographically prove that a RRset
does not exist by spanning a gap between two domain names in
a zone. NSEC specifies what type of records exist at a name
where it resides and points to the next domain name (in
canonical order) in the zone. One obvious drawback of NSEC
is that it makes it possible for enumerating the entire zone by
walking along the NSEC chain from one name to the next. To
fix the zone data exposure risk, an alternative was proposed:
NSEC3 [21] specifies hashed names, not original names, at
both ends of a gap. In the response to a query soliciting
DNSSEC authenticated non-existing record, an authoritative
server responses with NSEC/NSEC3 records along with their
signatures.
b) DNSSEC's Defending against Cache Poisoning
We analyze how DNSSEC is in place to protect DNS RRs
from cache poisoning attacks:
 If a zone is signed, then all its authoritative RRsets are
signed by DNSSEC and resistant against cache poisoning
attacks. This is due to the incapability of the attackers to
produce any signatures signed using the authenticated
DNSKEY over the forged authoritative RRsets. Note that the
NS RRsets at the delegating points and their glue RRs are not
among the zone's authoritative RRsets. And they are not signed
by DNSSEC.
 If a zone is signed and its child zone is signed, then its
NS RRSet at the delegating point is resistant against cache
poisoning attacks. As specified by the DNSSEC protocol, the
signed child zone has its DS RR in the parent zone, and the DS
is signed and thus verifiable using the authenticated DNSKEY
of the parent zone. The DS RR, which is the digest of the child
zone's DNSKEY, provides secure link to the child zone's
DNSKEY. In the child zone, its DNSKEY is used to sign its
authoritative RRSets, of course, including its NS RRSet. In
some practices, DNSKEY RRset is split into KSK (Key
Signing Key) and ZSK (Zone Signing Key). KSK is used to
sign the DNSKEY RRset and ZSK is used to sign the entire
zone except the DNSKEY RRset. The DS RR is mapped into
the KSK, which is used to sign the ZSK. And ZSK is used to
sign its NS RRSet. The trust link built between the parent zone
and the child zone is shown in Fig. 7.
Fig. 7. The trust link built between the parent zone and the child zone.
While the NS RRsets at the delegating points are not signed
by DNSSEC, any attempt to tamper them in the referral
response should also provide the bogus NS RRset in the child
(authoritative) zone as the replica of the bogus referral. The
former is signed by the ZSK of the child zone, which is in turn
verified through the parent-child trust link (see Fig. 7). So the
attacker is unable to form the signature over the bogus NS
RRset using the genuine ZSK.
 The glue records in a signed zone are vulnerable to
cache poisoning attacks if and only if their owner names falls
into an unsigned zone. The glue records are expected to be
consistent with their authoritative versions in the bailiwick-
checking. The attackers can always tamper the glue records
and meanwhile tamper their authoritative versions into the
same bogus ones if both of them are not signed. However,
when the owner names of the glue records are authenticated by
DNSSEC and thus tamper-resistant, any attempts to tamper the
glue records will cause inconsistency between the glue records
and their authoritative versions. Such inconsistency will be
detected and prevented from being accepted by the bailiwick-
checking. An authoritative server name that a domain is
delegated to, either in-bailiwick or out-of-bailiwick, should
always be allowed by bailiwick-checking. This fosters a
diversity of DNS delegations.
c) DNSSEC-aware Bailiwick-checking
As discussed above, DNSSEC strengthens the capability of
defending against cache poisoning attacks. And such
strengthening exploits DNSSEC-aware bailiwick-checking,
which integrates DNSSEC verification into the original
DNSSEC-oblivious bailiwick-checking:
 If a zone is signed, then all glue records in it should
pass the glue verification before they can be used to reach the
child zone. For any glue records whose owner names are in the
signed zone, the glue verification is initiated as the standard
DNSSEC verification over the glue records. That is, fetch the
authoritative versions of the glue records and then verify them
per DNSSEC specifications.
 If a zone is signed and its child zone is signed, the
bailiwick-checking should verify the authoritative NS RRset of
the child zone before comparing it with the NS RRsets at the
delegating point. Similar to the original DNSSEC-oblivious
bailiwick-checking, the DNSSEC-aware bailiwick-checking
should also follow the NS RRsets at the delegating point as
well as the glue records to obtain the authoritative NS RRset
from the child zone. Note that the glue record, if any, should be
verified first through the glue checking procedure stated above.
The DNSSEC-aware bailiwick-checking also obtains and
verifies the ZSK of the child zone following the trust of chain
(see Fig. 7). Using the authenticated ZSK, the bailiwick-
checking checks the authenticity of the authoritative NS RRset.
Failure of such authentication indicates the delegation under
check is untrustworthy. Otherwise, the verified authoritative
NS RRset is then compared against the NS RRsets at the
delegating point, and consistency between them is accepted as
trustworthy.
E. DNSSEC Vulnerabilities and the Exploit
As glue records are not signed, the first concern about
DNSSEC vulnerabilities lies in the forgeability of glue records.
The second class of venerabilities comes from the limited
DNSSEC deployment and the NSEC's "Opt-Out" option
allowing for insecure delegations to unsigned zones.
a) Glue Tampering Attacks
We discuss whether glue RR is tamper-resistant with
DNSSEC. While glue records are not signed in the signed zone
where it resides as glue records, the proposed DNSSEC-aware
bailiwick-checking can validate them only if they are signed at
their authoritative zones. However, we will illustrate in the
next section that in some cases, perhaps corner ones, a
validated signed response does not necessarily indicate glue
record's trustworthiness. We call this kind of zones as "signed
insecure zone".
The relative location relationship in the DNS hierarchy
between glue records' residing zone and authoritative zone may
be diverse. We make classified discussions as the following
four classes:
1) The authoritative zone falls beyond the domain of the
residing zone.
In the proposed DNSSEC-aware bailiwick-checking, the
recursive resolver relies on the standard name resolution of the
glue RR to find the authoritative version and its signature. But
the recursive resolver cannot foretell whether the authoritative
zone of the glue RR is signed or not until the glue RR is
resolved, because there is no RR as indicator in its residing
zone. So it is possible for the attackers to forge DNSSEC-
oblivious authoritative response without arousing any recursive
resolver's explicit suspicion about the authenticity of the bogus
response. We will show in the next section that if the
authoritative zone of the glue RR satisfies "signed insecure
zone", the attackers may redirect the glue RR to an unsigned
child zone of it, and then the finally answer is vulnerable to
tamping attacks.
We also consider the possibility of tampering the DNSSEC
signed authoritative response for the glue RR. This is almost
equivalent to compromising the private key or the entire
authoritative zone of the glue RR. DNSSEC protocols
themselves provide sufficient protection against such
compromising.
To summarize, the following three cases are listed:
 The authoritative zone is unsigned. Glue records are
vulnerable to tamping attacks.
 The authoritative zone is signed but "signed insecure
zone". Glue records are vulnerable to tamping attacks.
 The authoritative zone is signed and not "signed
insecure zone". Glue records are tamper-resistant.
2) The authoritative zone lies below the domain of the
residing zone but not within any of the residing zone's child
zone.
The glue records' residing zone itself is the authority for
them and thus signs them. So the glue records are protected by
DNSSEC against tamping attacks.
3) The authoritative zone lies below the domain of the
residing zone and within one of the residing zone's child zone
other than its child zone pertaining to the glue record's owner
name.
The vulnerability analysis is identical to Case 1. It is
obvious that the unsigned child zone implicates the
unverifiability of the authoritative version because the
recursive resolver can never fetch and check its signature.
However, it is notable that the signed child zone does not
necessarily mean verifiability of the authoritative version.
Given that the authoritative version lies within the child zone,
the child zone does not have to be authoritative for it. It is
commonplace that the authoritative version is delegated to a
child zone of the child zone, or its grandchild zone, etc. While
the child zone is signed, there is still possibility that its child
zone with the authoritative version below it is unsigned and
unverifiable.
4) The authoritative zone lies below the domain of the
residing zone and within the residing zone's child pertaining to
the glue record's owner name.
As the residing zone's child pertaining to the glue record's
owner name is signed, the vulnerability analysis is simplified
from Case 1 as:
 The authoritative zone is signed but "signed insecure
zone". Glue records are vulnerable to tamping attacks.
 The authoritative zone is signed and not "signed
insecure zone". Glue records are tamper-resistant.
b) Glue Redirection Attacks
Attackers may successfully tamper the glue records by
passing the bailiwick-checking in certain cases as analyzed
above. Then all queries towards the victim domain will be
redirected to the malicious IP addresses indicated by the
tampered glue records. The impacts are three-fold:
 The real authoritative nameservers of the victim
domain are prevented from receiving any query traffic towards
the victim zone.
 All query traffic towards the victim domain are
gathered and abused by the attackers, who may take full
control of the malicious IP addresses indicated by the tampered
glue records. Such concerns may be about the privacy and
sensitive information about Internet users leaking from the
aggregated DNS query data analysis.
 The faked authoritative nameservers for the signed
victim zone may response in any way to the queries: ① using
the real authoritative data, which are obtained from the real
authoritative server either by zone transfer (if permitted) or by
on demand queries; ② using the fabricated data, which are
likely to result in failure of validation at the DNSSEC-aware
recursive resolvers or validators (so the answer is labeled as
bogus) ; ③ using the fabricated but vulnerability-exploiting
data, which are likely to be validated by the DNSSEC-aware
recursive resolvers or validators and be trusted by them (so the
answer is labeled as trustworthy); ④ just playing as
unresponsive at all, which is kind of DoS (Denial of Service)
attacks.
Among the four classes of possible behaviors taken by the
faked authoritative nameserver, the 3rd is the most hazardous
one because it can potentially cheat the DNSSEC validators
into accepting the bogus data as authenticated. Such attacks are
called "glue redirection attacks" hereafter.
c) NSEC3 Opt-Out Vulnerabilities and the Exploit
Opt-Out is normally relevant as a feature of NSEC3 when a
zone has a significant number of delegations (frequently called
a delegation-centric zone in the jargon) and inhibits generation
of NSEC3 RRs when an unsigned delegation occurs. An
unsigned delegation has NS and glue records but no DS RR(s).
In an Opt-Out zone, hashed owner names of unsigned
delegations may be excluded from the NSEC3 chain. An
NSEC3 resource record that has the Opt-Out flag set to 1 may
have its span cover the hash of an owner name or "next closer"
name of an unsigned delegation. Such a relatively modest step
can have a huge impact on zone file size as well as cost of
maintaining NSEC3 chain for frequently updated insecure
delegations especially, but not exclusively, for TLD zones.
In essence, NSEC3 Opt-Out is a transition method to ease
the operation of delegation-centric zone when DNSSEC is not
so prevalent. Although Opt-Out is advantageous in terms of its
manageability for a diminished secure zone, it also blurs the
authenticated presence of different responses by providing
somewhat overlapping NSEC3 records for them. This
introduces the vulnerabilities of secure shift from the real
response to an forged alternative, and such shift is unlikely to
be detected and prevented by the current DNSSEC
specifications. We present here three classes of Opt-Out
vulnerabilities:
1) Transforming an authenticated positive response to a
insecure delegation.
An authenticated positive response is illustrated as an
example in Fig. 8, where the domain in question is
"a.c.example". The authenticated positive response can be
transformed by attackers into a insecure delegation (see Fig. 9)
if and only if the following conditions are satisfied in order:
① At least one subdomain (e.g., "c.example" in Fig. 9) of
the victim domain (e.g., "a.c.example" in Fig. 9) is non-
existent. Otherwise, the transformation is impossible.
② The hash value of the non-existent subdomain (e.g.,
"c.example" in Fig. 9) is covered by a NSEC3 Opt-Out RR
(e.g., "35mthgpgcu..." NSEC3 RR in Fig. 9). And neither the
NSEC3 RR's owner name nor its next name match the hash
value of the victim domain. That is (in Fig. 8)
H(a.c.example) ≠ 35mthgpgcu1qg68fab165klnsnk3dpvl
and
H(a.c.example) ≠ b4um86eghhds6nea196smvmlo4ors995
Otherwise, the transformation is impossible.
③ There is a NSEC3 RR (e.g., "0p9mha..." NSEC3 RR in
Fig. 8) that matches the closest encloser (e.g., "example" in Fig.
8). And the NSEC3 RR's next name does not match the hash
value of the victim domain. That is (in Fig. 8)
H(a.c.example) ≠ 2t7b4g4vsa5smi47k61mv5bv1a22bojr
Otherwise, the transformation is impossible.
The RR on which such authenticated transformation takes
place is called "signed insecure RR". A zone with at least one
"signed insecure RR" is the aforementioned "signed insecure
zone".
The first condition decides whether the victim domain falls
into a child zone, which may be insecurely delegated
potentially covered by an NSEC3 Opt-Out RR. The second
condition identifies the existence of the NSEC3 Opt-Out RR
covering the subdomain, and its two mismatch checking ensure
that the victim domain is not accidentally leaked from the
owner name or the next name of the NSEC3 Opt-Out RR. The
third condition ensure that the victim domain is not
accidentally leaked from the next name of the closest encloser
of NSEC3 RR.
We use the following notations for a general case: the
target zone: DOMAIN; the victim domain: An. An-1. ... . A2. A1.
DOMAIN. The attack model is elaborated in the following
steps:
① Once finding that the response from "DOMAIN" for "An.
An-1. ... . A2. A1. DOMAIN" is a positive response, the attacker
initiates the suffix to check as the victim domain, and then
moves to step 2.
② The attacker moves the current suffix one label to the
left as the updated suffix to check. If the suffix to check is
"DOMAIN", return with an indicator of "inconvertibility" for
the victim domain. Otherwise, moves to step 3.
③ The attacker sends the query for the suffix to the real
authoritative nameservers of "DOMAIN" . If the response is
positive, go to step 2. Otherwise, extract the covering NSEC3
RR and the closest encloser NSEC3 RR in the authenticated
negative response, and then check whether Condition 2 and 3
are both satisfied. If so, return with an indicator of
"convertibility" for the victim domain. Otherwise, go to step 2.
④ If the victim domain is labeled as "convertibility", forge
the transformed response as follows:
Add the delegation whose owner name is the victim
domain's current suffix, and whose nameserver(s) and glue
RR(s) are arbitrary, perhaps malicious.
Add the covering NSEC3 RR and the closest encloser
NSEC3 RR as well as their signatures extracted from the real
authenticated negative response.
Add other RRs if necessary.
;; Question
a.c.example. IN A
;; Answer
a.c.example. IN A 192.0.2.1
a.c.example. RRSIG A 5 3 3600 20040509183619 (
20040409183619 38519 example.
Il2WTZ+Bkv+OytBx4LItNW5mjB4RCwhOO8y1
XzPHZmZUTVYL7LaA63f6T9ysVBzJRI3KRjAP
H3U1qaYnDoN1DrWqmi9RJe4FoObkbcdm7P3I
;; Authority
example. NS ns1.example.
example. NS ns2.example.
example. RRSIG NS 5 1 3600 20040509183619 (
20040409183619 38519 example.
gl13F00f2U0R+SWiXXLHwsMY+qStYy5k6zfd
EuivWc+wd1fmbNCyql0Tk7lHTX6UOxc8AgNf
4ISFve8XqF4q+o9qlnqIzmppU3LiNeKT4FZ8
RO5urFOvoMRTbQxW3U0hXWuggE4g3ZpsHv48
0HjMeRaZB/FRPGfJPajngcq6Kwg= )
;; Additional
...
Fig. 8. Example of an authenticated positive response.
2) Transforming a non-existent negative response to an
insecure delegation.
An authenticated non-existent negative response is
illustrated as an example in Fig. 10, where the domain in
question is "a.c.x.w.example". The authenticated non-existent
negative response can be transformed by attackers into a
insecure delegation (see Fig. 11) if and only if the following
condition is satisfied: the non-existent domain is covered by a
NSEC3 Opt-Out RR.
;; Question
a.c.example. IN A
;; Answer
;; (empty)
;; Authority
c.example. NS ns1.c.example.
NS ns2.c.example.
;; NSEC3 Opt-Out RR that covers the "next closer" name (c.example)
;; H(c.example) = 4g6p9u5gvfshp30pqecj98b3maqbn1ck
35mthgpgcu1qg68fab165klnsnk3dpvl.example. NSEC3 1 1 12 aabbccdd (
b4um86eghhds6nea196smvmlo4ors995 NS DS RRSIG )
35mthgpgcu1qg68fab165klnsnk3dpvl.example. RRSIG NSEC3 7 2 3600 (
20150420235959 20051021000000 40430 example.
g6jPUUpduAJKRljUsN8gB4UagAX0NxY9shwQ
Aynzo8EUWH+z6hEIBlUTPGj15eZll6VhQqgZ
XtAIR3chwgW+SA== )
;; NSEC3 RR that matches the closest encloser (example)
;; H(example) = 0p9mhaveqvm6t7vbl5lop2u3t2rp3tom
0p9mhaveqvm6t7vbl5lop2u3t2rp3tom.example. NSEC3 1 1 12 aabbccdd (
2t7b4g4vsa5smi47k61mv5bv1a22bojr MX DNSKEY NS
SOA NSEC3PARAM RRSIG )
0p9mhaveqvm6t7vbl5lop2u3t2rp3tom.example. RRSIG NSEC3 7 2 3600 (
20150420235959 20051021000000 40430 example.
OSgWSm26B+cS+dDL8b5QrWr/dEWhtCsKlwKL
IBHYH6blRxK9rC0bMJPwQ4mLIuw85H2EY762
BOCXJZMnpuwhpA== )
;; Additional
ns1.c.example. A 192.0.2.7
ns2.c.example. A 192.0.2.8
Fig. 9. Example of a NSEC3 Opt-Out insecure delegation response.
The attack model is to manipulate the response as follows:
Take out the SOA RR and the NSEC3 RR that covers
wildcard at the closest encloser as well as their associated
RRSIG RRs.
Add the delegation whose owner name is the "next closer"
name of the victim non-existent domain, and whose
nameserver(s) and glue RR(s) are arbitrary, perhaps malicious.
;; Question
a.c.x.w.example. IN A
;; Answer
;; (empty)
;; Authority
example. SOA ns1.example. bugs.x.w.example. 1 3600 300 (
3600000 3600 )
example. RRSIG SOA 7 1 3600 20150420235959 20051021000000 (
40430 example.
Hu25UIyNPmvPIVBrldN+9Mlp9Zql39qaUd8i
q4ZLlYWfUUbbAS41pG+68z81q1xhkYAcEyHd
VI2LmKusbZsT0Q== )
;; NSEC3 Opt-Out RR that covers the "next closer" name (c.x.w.example)
;; H(c.x.w.example) = 0va5bpr2ou0vk0lbqeeljri88laipsfh
0p9mhaveqvm6t7vbl5lop2u3t2rp3tom.example. NSEC3 1 1 12 aabbccdd (
2t7b4g4vsa5smi47k61mv5bv1a22bojr MX DNSKEY NS
SOA NSEC3PARAM RRSIG )
0p9mhaveqvm6t7vbl5lop2u3t2rp3tom.example. RRSIG NSEC3 7 2 3600 (
20150420235959 20051021000000 40430 example.
OSgWSm26B+cS+dDL8b5QrWr/dEWhtCsKlwKL
IBHYH6blRxK9rC0bMJPwQ4mLIuw85H2EY762
BOCXJZMnpuwhpA== )
;; NSEC3 RR that matches the closest encloser (x.w.example)
;; H(x.w.example) = b4um86eghhds6nea196smvmlo4ors995
b4um86eghhds6nea196smvmlo4ors995.example. NSEC3 1 1 12 aabbccdd (
gjeqe526plbf1g8mklp59enfd789njgi MX RRSIG )
b4um86eghhds6nea196smvmlo4ors995.example. RRSIG NSEC3 7 2 3600 (
20150420235959 20051021000000 40430 example.
ZkPG3M32lmoHM6pa3D6gZFGB/rhL//Bs3Omh
5u4m/CUiwtblEVOaAKKZd7S959OeiX43aLX3
pOv0TSTyiTxIZg== )
;; NSEC3 RR that covers wildcard at the closest encloser (*.x.w.example)
;; H(*.x.w.example) = 92pqneegtaue7pjatc3l3qnk738c6v5m
35mthgpgcu1qg68fab165klnsnk3dpvl.example. NSEC3 1 1 12 aabbccdd (
b4um86eghhds6nea196smvmlo4ors995 NS DS RRSIG )
35mthgpgcu1qg68fab165klnsnk3dpvl.example. RRSIG NSEC3 7 2 3600 (
20150420235959 20051021000000 40430 example.
g6jPUUpduAJKRljUsN8gB4UagAX0NxY9shwQ
Aynzo8EUWH+z6hEIBlUTPGj15eZll6VhQqgZ
XtAIR3chwgW+SA== )
;; Additional
;; (empty)
Fig. 10. Example of an authenticated non-existent negative response.
3) Transforming an insecure delegation to a non-existent
negative response
Conversely, the attackers may transform an insecure
delegation to a non-existent negative response. The attack
model is to manipulate the response as follows:
To obtain the NSEC3 RR that covers wildcard at the closest
encloser (e.g., "*.x.w.example"), the attacker can send a query
for a non-existent domain (e.g., "ayh2s0e9s.x.w.example" ) to
the real authoritative nameservers of the target zone (e.g.,
"example"), and then extract the NSEC3 RR in demand from
the response as well as its signature.
To obtain the SOA RR, the attacker can send a query for
the SOA RR of the target zone (e.g., "example") to its real
authoritative nameservers, and then extract the SOA RR in
demand from the response as well as its signature.
Taken out the insecure delegation in the answer section and
the glue RR(s) in the additional section.
Add the NSEC3 RR that covers wildcard at the closest
encloser and the SOA RR as well as their RRSIGs in the
authority section.
;; Question
a.c.x.w.example. IN A
;; Answer
;; (empty)
;; Authority
c.x.w.example. NS ns1.c.x.w.example.
NS ns2.c.x.w.example.
;; NSEC3 Opt-Out RR that covers the "next closer" name (c.x.w.example)
;; H(c.x.w.example) = 0va5bpr2ou0vk0lbqeeljri88laipsfh
0p9mhaveqvm6t7vbl5lop2u3t2rp3tom.example. NSEC3 1 1 12 aabbccdd (
2t7b4g4vsa5smi47k61mv5bv1a22bojr MX DNSKEY NS
SOA NSEC3PARAM RRSIG )
0p9mhaveqvm6t7vbl5lop2u3t2rp3tom.example. RRSIG NSEC3 7 2 3600 (
20150420235959 20051021000000 40430 example.
OSgWSm26B+cS+dDL8b5QrWr/dEWhtCsKlwKL
IBHYH6blRxK9rC0bMJPwQ4mLIuw85H2EY762
BOCXJZMnpuwhpA== )
;; NSEC3 RR that matches the closest encloser (x.w.example)
;; H(x.w.example) = b4um86eghhds6nea196smvmlo4ors995
b4um86eghhds6nea196smvmlo4ors995.example. NSEC3 1 1 12 aabbccdd (
gjeqe526plbf1g8mklp59enfd789njgi MX RRSIG )
b4um86eghhds6nea196smvmlo4ors995.example. RRSIG NSEC3 7 2 3600 (
20150420235959 20051021000000 40430 example.
ZkPG3M32lmoHM6pa3D6gZFGB/rhL//Bs3Omh
5u4m/CUiwtblEVOaAKKZd7S959OeiX43aLX3
pOv0TSTyiTxIZg== )
;; Additional
ns1.c.x.w.example. A 192.0.2.7
ns2.c.x.w.example. A 192.0.2.8
Fig. 11. Example of a NSEC3 Opt-Out insecure delegation response.
IV. MEASUREMENTS OF GLUE'S AVAILABILITY AND SECURITY
NIST provides the estimation of IPv6 & DNSSEC
deployment status by sampling some second level domains
[22]. Our measurements borrow the same second level
domains list as used in the NIST's estimation. The list has 1070
large industrial US domains, which come from Fortune 1000
list as well as domains collected from the Alexa list of the top
100 sites in the US.
First, we measure the distribution of different glue types as
well as glue's redundancy and deficiency. As analyzed in
Section II, glue types can be classified as:
1) Self-contained; glue RR(s) must be present to ensure
availability.
2) Cyclic dependency; the minimum glue RR(s) to ensure
availability are the one(s) only in one zone involved in the
cyclic dependency.
3) Out-of-bailiwick; the minimum glue RR(s) to ensure
availability are none.
Excessive glue RR(s) except the minimum can be taken as
redundancy and give rise to inconsistency concerns. The results
of glue type and status distribution are shown in Table 1. Some
domains' glue may cover more than one glue types, e.g., a
domain may have a self-contained glue and an out-of-bailiwick
glue simultaneously. We can see in Table 1 that self-contained
glue is the most prevalent glue type of the three, covering more
than half of the total domains. Only a small minority of
domains use cyclic dependency glue, perhaps due to the
complexity of management. In general, the provision of glue
RRs are sufficient and far more than necessary in terms of
domain resolution availability. Specifically, for self-contained
glues, where glue RR(s) should always be present, no
volitation is found. And all cyclic dependency glues provide
excessive glue RR(s). The most remarkable redundancies lie
in out-of-bailiwick glues, of which only 12 domains add no
glue RR(s) and the rest are attached with superfluous glue
RR(s). In percentage terms, 49.2% of the total are subject to
glue RR redundancies, and 98.3% out of the possibly excessive
glues have redundant glue RRs.
TABLE I. GLUE TYPE AND STATUS DISTRIBUTION
Glue Type/Status Present/
Redundant
Minimum Absence
Self-contained 728 0
Cyclic dependency 12 0 0
Out-of-bailiwick 693 12
We then measure the security vulnerabilities of the domains
signed by DNSSEC. Of the list of domains, only 17 domains
are signed, which are mostly owned by IT companies or
organizations. This shares the same conclusion with previous
measurements that DNSSEC deployment is quite limited in the
domain levels lower than TLD. Except for the IT industry, the
Internet society lacks the awareness and readiness of DNSSEC.
The low DNSSEC penetration rate may also be attributed to
the insufficient technical and/or funding capacities for a large
number of non-IT or small companies or organizations.
According to the bailiwick location of glue and the status of
DNSSEC deployment, we classify the glues into:
1) Self-contained. The glue falls into the SLD in
investigation, and the SLD is, of course, signed.
2) Signed cross-domain. The glue falls beyond the
parent(or TLD) of the SLD in investigation and is signed.
3) Unsigned cross-domain. The glue falls beyond the
parent(or TLD) of the SLD in investigation and is unsigned.
4) Signed cross-subdomain. The glue falls into a SLD
which is other than the SLD in investigation and shares the
TLD with it, and is signed.
5) Unsigned cross-subdomain. The glue falls into a SLD
which is other than the SLD in investigation and shares the
TLD with it, and is unsigned.
As analyzed in Section III, we evaluate the glue and zone
vulnerabilities of the domains with DNSSEC. Any domain that
has at least one of its glue RR(s) unsigned or one of its signed
glue RR(s) have the NSEC3 Opt-Out vulnerabilities, are
regarded as glue forgeability. Glue forgeability means the
domain is vulnerable to glue tampering attacks. The domains
with glue forgeability may be further subject to zone
forgeability. Zone forgeability means the domain may be
redirected to the bogus nameserver(s), which then hijack its
RR(s) in the zone. Zone forgeability also exploits the NSEC3
Opt-Out vulnerabilities. To simplify the evaluations, we do not
enumerate the RRs in the zone and test their forgeability one
by one. Instead, any domain with glue forgeability which sets
the NSEC3 Opt-Out is regarded as zone forgeability.
The bailiwick location of glue and the status of DNSSEC
deployment as well as the glue and zone vulnerabilities are
shown in Fig. 12. We can see that if the glue falls beyond the
parent(or TLD) of the SLD in investigation, whether it is
signed or not are approximately equally likely. But if the glue
falls into a SLD which is other than the SLD in investigation
and shares the TLD with it, it is more likely to be signed. So a
domain's operator should be cautious when setting its cross-
domain glues. Fig. 12 also illustrates nearly half of domains
are glue forgeable, which is largely due to their unsigned glues.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Pe
rc
en
t o
f d
om
ai
ns
 
 
Self-contained
Signed cross-domain
Unsigned cross-domain
Signed cross-subdomain
Unsigned cross-subdomain
Glue forgeable
Zone forgeable
Fig. 12. The bailiwick location of glue and the status of DNSSEC deployment,
and the glue and zone vulnerabilities.
To further investigate the glue and zone vulnerabilities, we
show the DNSSEC and security status of glues in Fig. 13. We
can see that a domain with all its glues signed is no guarantee
of glue security. Instead, its glue is still forgeable if at least
one of the glue's subdomain is subject to the NSEC3 Opt-Out
vulnerability (as analyzed in Section III). A domain with at
least one of its glues unsigned likewise does not necessarily
means zone forgeability. If and only if the domain with
forgeable glues uses NSEC3 and sets Opt-Out, it is vulnerable
to zone forgeability.
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Fig. 13. The status of DNSSEC deployment and the glue and zone
vulnerabilities.
V. RELATED WORK
DNS availability and interdependency issues are studied in
[23] and [25]. Deccio et al. [23] proposed a formal model for
analyzing the name dependencies inherent in DNS, and derived
metrics to quantify the extent to which domain names affect
other domain names. Yuan et al. [25] proposed metrics
quantifying the Quality of Domain Name Service, and
presented an analytical model of DNS proxy operations that
offers insights into the design trade-offs of DNS infrastructure
and the selection of critical DNS parameters. The threats of
DNS, in the view of hackers and malware criminals, are
surveyed in [31]. Shue et al. [28] examined DNS resolver
behavior and usage, from query patterns and reactions to
nonstandard responses to passive association techniques to pair
resolvers with their client hosts.
The DNSSEC deployment challenges and impacts are
extensive examined in recent years. Herzberg et al. [26]
outlined the significant challenges and pitfalls that have
resulted in severely limited DNSSEC deployment, and
suggested directions for improvement and further research.
Osterweil et al. [24] developed SecSpider, a DNSSEC
monitoring system that helps identify operational errors in the
DNSSEC deployment and discover unforeseen obstacles.
Herzberg et al. [27] discussed the state of DNSSEC
deployment and obstacles to adoption, and presented an
overview of challenges and potential pitfalls of DNSSEC,
including incremental deployment, long DNSSEC responses,
trust model of DNS. Osterweil et al. [29] proposed to achieve
robust DNSSEC verification with a new theoretical model,
which treats operational deployments as Communities of Trust
(CoTs) and makes them the verification substrate. Yang et al.
[30] provided the systematic examination of the design,
deployment, and operational challenges encountered by
DNSSEC over the years, and revealed a fundamental gap
between cryptographic designs and operational Internet
systems.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper gives an extensive study of glue, a prevalent
DNS configurations. Our analysis reveals the minimum glue
records in terms of availability. And we also discover the
security vulnerabilities of glue including three types of NSEC
Opt-Out vulnerabilities. The measurements show the wide
occurrences of glue redundancies and glue vulnerabilities in
DNS practices.
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